

the railroad which addresses the location and quantity of the materials used, as well as vulnerability of the materials to ignition, flame spread, and smoke generation. These portions include equipment carrying portions of a vehicle's roof and the interior structure separating the levels of a bi-level car, but do not include a flooring assembly subject to Note 16. A railroad is not required to use the ASTM E 119-00a test method.

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#### APPENDIX C TO PART 238—SUSPENSION SYSTEM SAFETY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

This appendix contains the minimum suspension system safety performance standards for Tier II passenger equipment as required by §238.427. These requirements shall be the basis for evaluating suspension system safety performance until an industry standard acceptable to FRA is developed and approved under the procedures provided in §238.21.

(a) Passenger equipment suspension systems shall be designed to limit the lateral and vertical forces and lateral to vertical (L/V) ratios, for the time duration required to travel five feet at any operating speed or over any class of track, under all operating conditions as determined by the railroad, as follows:

(1) The maximum single wheel lateral to vertical force (L/V) ratio shall not exceed Nadal's limit as follows:

$$\text{Wheel L/V} \leq \frac{\tan(\delta) - \mu}{1 + \mu \tan(\delta)}$$

where:

$\delta$ =flange angle (deg).

$\mu$ =coefficient of friction of 0.5.

(2) The net axle lateral force shall not exceed 0.5 times the static vertical axle load.

(3) The vertical wheel/rail force shall not be less than or equal to 10 percent of the static vertical wheel load.

(4) The sum of the vertical wheel loads on one side of any truck shall not be less than or equal to 20 percent of the static vertical axle load. This shall include the effect of a crosswind allowance as specified by the railroad for the intended service.

(5) The maximum truck side L/V ratio shall not exceed 0.6.

(6) When stopped on track with a uniform 6-inch superelevation, vertical wheel loads, at all wheels, shall not be less than or equal to 60 percent of the nominal vertical wheel load on level track.

(b) For purposes of this appendix, wheel/rail force measurements shall be processed through a low pass filter having a cut-off frequency of 25 Hz.

#### APPENDIX D TO PART 238—REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTERNAL FUEL TANKS ON TIER I LOCOMOTIVES

The requirements contained in this appendix are intended to address the structural and puncture resistance properties of the locomotive fuel tank to reduce the risk of fuel spillage to acceptable levels under derailment and minor collision conditions.

(a) *Structural strength*—(1) *Load case 1—minor derailment.* The end plate of the fuel tank shall support a sudden loading of one-half the weight of the car body at a vertical acceleration of 2g, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the material. The load is assumed to be supported on one rail, within an eight inch band (plus or minus) at a point nominally above the head of the rail, on tangent track. Consideration should be given in the design of the fuel tank to maximize the vertical clearance between the top of the rail and the bottom of the fuel tank.

(2) *Load case 2—jackknifed locomotive.* The fuel tank shall support transversely at the center a sudden loading equivalent to one half the weight of the locomotive at a vertical acceleration of 2g, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the material. The load is assumed to be supported on one rail, distributed between the longitudinal center line and the edge of the tank bottom, with a rail head surface of two inches.

(3) *Load case 3—side impact.* In a side impact collision by an 80,000 pound Gross Vehicle Weight tractor/trailer at the longitudinal center of the fuel tank, the fuel tank shall withstand, without exceeding the ultimate strength, a 200,000 pound load (2.5g) distributed over an area of six inches by forty-eight inches (half the bumper area) at a height of thirty inches above the rail (standard DOT bumper height).

(4) *Load case 4—penetration resistance.* The minimum thickness of the sides, bottom sheet and end plates of the fuel tank shall be equivalent to a 5/16-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-square-inch yield strength (where the thickness varies inversely with the square root of yield strength). The lower one third of the end plates shall have the equivalent penetration resistance by the above method of a 3/4-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-square-inch yield strength. This may be accomplished by any combination of materials or other mechanical protection.

(b) *Sideswipe.* To minimize fuel tank damage during sideswipes (railroad vehicles and grade crossings), all drain plugs, clean-out ports, inspection covers, sight glasses, gauge openings, etc., must be flush with the tank surface or adequately protected to avoid catching foreign objects or breakage. All seams must be protected or flush to avoid catching foreign objects.

(c) *Spill controls.* Vents and fills shall be designed to avert spillage of fuel in the event of a roll over.

#### APPENDIX E TO PART 238—GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RELIABILITY-BASED MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS

(a) Any maintenance program has the following four basic objectives:

(1) To ensure realization of the design level of safety and reliability of the equipment;

(2) To restore safety and reliability to their design levels when deterioration has occurred;

(3) To obtain the information necessary for design improvements of those items whose design reliability proves inadequate; and

(4) To accomplish these goals at a minimum total cost, including maintenance costs and the costs of residual failures.

(b) Reliability-based maintenance programs are based on the following general principles. A failure is an unsatisfactory condition. There are two types of failures: functional and potential. Functional failures are usually reported by operating crews. Conversely, maintenance crews usually discover potential failures. A potential failure is an identifiable physical condition, which indicates that a functional failure is imminent. The consequences of a functional failure determine the priority of a maintenance effort. These consequences fall into the following general categories:

(1) Safety consequences, involving possible loss of the equipment and its occupants;

(2) Operational consequences, which involve an indirect economic loss as well as the direct cost of repair;

(3) Non-operational consequences, which involve only the direct cost of repair; or

(4) Hidden failure consequences, which involve exposure to a possible multiple failure as a result of the undetected failure of a hidden function.

(c) In a reliability-based maintenance program, scheduled maintenance is required for any item whose loss of function or mode of failure could have safety consequences. If preventative tasks cannot reduce the risk of such failures to an acceptable level, the item requires redesign to alter its failure consequences. Scheduled maintenance is also required for any item whose functional failure will not be evident to the operating crew, and therefore reported for corrective action. In all other cases the consequences of failure are economic, and maintenance tasks directed at preventing such failures must be justified on economic grounds. All failure consequences, including economic consequences, are established by the design characteristics of the equipment and can be altered only by basic changes in the design. Safety consequences can, in nearly all cases, be reduced to economic consequences by the

use of redundancy. Hidden functions can usually be made evident by instrumentation or other design features. The feasibility and cost effectiveness of scheduled maintenance depend on the inspectability of the component, and the cost of corrective maintenance depends on its failure modes and design reliability.

(d) The design reliability of equipment or components will only be achieved with an effective maintenance program. This level of reliability is established by the design of each component and the manufacturing processes that produced it. Scheduled maintenance can ensure that design reliability of each component is achieved, but maintenance alone cannot yield a level of reliability beyond the design reliability.

(e) When a maintenance program is developed, it includes tasks that satisfy the criteria for both applicability and effectiveness. The applicability of a task is determined by the characteristics of the component or equipment to be maintained. The effectiveness is stated in terms of the consequences that the task is designed to prevent. The basic types of tasks that are performed by maintenance personnel are each applicable under a unique set of conditions. Tasks may be directed at preventing functional failures or preventing a failure event consisting of the sequential occurrence of two or more independent failures which may have consequences that would not be produced by any of the failures occurring separately. The task types include:

(1) Inspections of an item to find and correct any potential failures;

(2) Rework/remanufacture/overhaul of an item at or before some specified time or age limit;

(3) Discard of an item (or parts of it) at or before some specified life limit; and

(4) Failure finding inspections of a hidden-function item to find and correct functional failures that have already occurred but were not evident to the operating crew.

(b) Components or systems in a reliability-based maintenance program may be defined as simple or complex. A simple component or system is one that is subject to only one or a very few failure modes. This type of component or system frequently shows decreasing reliability with increasing operating age. An age/time limit may be used to reduce the overall failure rate of simple components or systems. Here, safe-life limits, fail-safe designs, or damage tolerance-based residual life calculations may be imposed on a single component or system to play a crucial role in controlling critical failures. Complex components or systems are ones whose functional failure may result from many different failure modes and show little or no decrease in overall reliability with increasing age unless there is a dominant failure mode. Therefore, age limits imposed on complex